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Preface: The Apotheosis of War in Colombia 
 
 Not even God would bother coming to look in here. During afternoons like this the 
city was lost to me. Turning its back, the city closed itself to my gaze as well as to the eyes of 
any of its inhabitants, humans and not. It surrounded me but never faced me. The surrounding 
solitude imposed upon me  a background of meaning: “the city was human but cried like a 
caged animal.” It had become a black box. If so, I was the cat within it.   
 The city was Bogotá, but could have been any other city; a city in Germany, for 
instance. Many years ago I was a kid in Colombia who spent long afternoons during summer 
break doing work at his Aunt Clara’s shop to buy himself a bicycle. The shop sold colors, 
creams, and slimming girdles that promised passersby all sorts of magical effects. In they 
came, dead city dwellers, to this small cube fitted with transparent shelves exhibiting 
alchemical potions; out they went, feeling made up, alive.  
 In most cities, reality is defined by whether you are alive or dead. Not in Bogotá. 
Certainly not back then. To begin with, it rains too much. The city turns gray and you can’t 
see, for it rains lead and heavy metals. The real vanishes in front of your eyes. Then there is 
the apotheosis of war. I use the term in two senses: first, deification. Ever since war became 
our true religion no one in this city could be certain whether to count oneself among the 
living, or for how long. Life and death are now matters of probability, not so much in the 
sense of a game of chance or a throw of the dice but rather in the aesthetic sense that invented 
fables provided us with as much conviction as historical examples, if not more. Second, I use 
the term apotheosis to mean quintessence. My reference here is to an 1871 painting by Basil 
Verestchagin that he dedicated to all conquerors, past, present and to come. That image, more 
real than reality itself, evokes the quintessence of our reality. Like the painting, the reality of 
our war-torn cities consisted mainly of a pyramid of buried boxes with no remains piled high 
like a massive monument in the central square or like an artwork of the future memorializing 
the zombie apocalypse. But the people are missing.  
That is what happens above, on the surface. But if you turn that surface upside down, you 
will see that the whole country was and still is a mass grave. Was our reality ever something 
other than a horde of destructions? This horde of destructions is a picture of ourselves, now, 
as Wallace Stevens says, an image of our society.
1
 Let me call the subjective effect of a 
landscape torn apart by war and indebtedness, which becomes parallel to and more real than 
the objectivity of violence and plunder, “the upside”, with a nod to Verestchagin and the 
1980s nostalgia of the Duffer Brothers.  
 That summer in the upside was a long, lonely, silent season. Customers were rare, 
friendly visitors more so. Boredom set in, an uninvited, speechless companion. During a 
hunting expedition to the back of the shop, prompted by boredom, I found a stack of books. 
Crime stories by Raymond Chandler and Edgar Allan Poe; Dashiell Hammet’s The Maltese 
Falcon; a newspaper edition of Mike Hammer’s series; two spy thrillers by John Le Carré; 
and a compendium of mysteries penned by one Horacio Bustos Domecq. The summer of 
solitude was about to be saved by pulp fiction. Then my cousin went missing.  
 
The People Are Missing 
 
 It is common sense and logic to think that a missing person is either dead or alive. We 
call them desaparecidos, the disappeared. There were plenty of those during the apotheosis of 
the war in Colombia; my cousin Hugo was merely one of them. His mother, my auntie, came 
to the shop and told me that in the morning, when she was still in bed, a bird flew in, 
mistaking a huge painting of a forest for the real thing, circled the room, saw his error and 
flew back out the window past the orange trees to alight on a high voltage wire. Were those 
the real trees or the painted ones? My aunt didn’t say, but she believed the bird was her boy. 
For her, Hugo was neither dead nor completely alive. 
 In Nostalgia for the Light (2010), documentary filmmaker Patricio Guzmán tells the 
story of the mothers and wives of the disappeared who perpetually search for the bones of 
their loved ones, left behind in Chile’s Atacama Desert by President Augusto Pinochet’s 
genocide. That genocide inaugurated the world we live in. In this same barren landscape, 
astronomers from all over the world gather atop gigantic lunar mountains to observe the 
distant stars. The sky there is so translucid they can peer through their telescopes right into 
the very limits of the universe. Back on Earth, the harshness of the landscape and the heat of 
the sun keep human remains almost intact: those of pre-Columbian indigenous peoples; those 
of miners who have been extracting copper and rare earths from the upside since at least the 
nineteenth century; and those of people disappeared, tortured, and killed by the Chilean Army 
at the behest of their industrialist masters, among them Hoescht Chemical and ITT 
Communications, after the coup of 11 September, 1973.
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 Melding the sublime quest of the astronomers and the earthly one of the women 
searchers, Guzmán points out that if for grand physics reality is defined by the logic and 
common sense of either/or, then when it comes to light, be it the light that addresses us from 
the depths of the cosmos or that which my auntie saw on the morning when the swallow 
came in through the window, such physics are insufficient. For the mothers of the 
disappeared, their loved ones are both dead and alive, and remain so as long as they continue 
to await the moment when they find out what happened to them; that is, as long as they lack a 
point of focus. 
 Is it not the same when it comes to the enigmas of crime novels? Is it not the case 
that, lacking a point of focus, the hardboiled detectives of these thrillers must invent one; 
invent an object for their quest, which is often imagined as kept within an enclosure of some 
kind, for otherwise the proverbial cat in the black box will remain both dead and alive, 
spectral? If this is so, then the only literature that could describe their cases is neither factual 
nor fictional; the only normative practice for their cases would be one that takes into account 
the unidentifiable in the register of human beings and human rights alike; and the only critical 
theory, if any, a visual one of the unfocused and invisible.  
 It is among such anomalous forms of writing that the charitable reader should inscribe 
the register of this piece. Neither fact nor fiction, it dabbles in metaphysics, it deals with 
fetishes and monads (“living mirrors of the universe,” Leibniz called them), with visuals and 
what cannot be seen, as well as with states of entanglement that are by definition ambiguous, 
transformational, or transitional. This essay explores the ambiguous nature of these specters 
born of cosmic dramaturgy and the apotheosis of war, and the objects as well as the 
landscapes with which they’re entangled or that they occupy and invest, from where they 
address us. If so, if it deals with the missing and their sublime objects, with the apotheosis of 
war and a landscape’s address, then this is also an essay about transitional justice; or better 
yet, about justice transitional.    
 But isn’t the theory of transitional states of entanglement also known as quantum 
theory? So much for metaphysics! I am of course not the first one to suggest an analogy 
between the insidious scenarios of Erwin Schrödinger’s 1935 thought experiment with cats 
and black boxes and the real nightmare of those of us whose children, husbands, and cousins 
were erased by the storms of lead and heavy metals that fell upon the cities we inhabited at 
the end of the twentieth century and that continue to fall in this one.     
 The quantum physicist imagined a box with a cat inside, let’s call it Theodor to honor 
an actual philosopher as well as an Argentine writer, a cat that could be killed at any moment 
by radiation or a lethal gas or not killed at all. Both outcomes were probable. Furthermore, 
according to the theory there wasn’t just one Theodor inside the box, but two: one dead, one 
alive; superimposed or copresent; in transition and materially entangled with one another as 
long as the box remained closed. More disorienting is the fact that when the box is opened 
the entanglement and the transitional state of the dead and the live cat come to an end, not 
because Theodor actually dies or lives but because we peer into it. It is the act of observation 
that actively shapes reality, in the sense that seeing, describing, and measuring provoke the 
second death of the cat, the one that ends its time in purgatory. Euclidian geometry and 
physics, mainstream biology, legal determinacy, as well as Aristotelian geopolitics and 
rhetoric seem of little help when, as visual artist and essayist Hito Steyerl says, “the state of 
the missing speaks of a paradoxical superimposition that cannot be understood” with the 
usual conceptual tools, for it perhaps “reaches out to an impossible coexistence of life and 
death,” one between the stars above and the mass graves in the upside  below.4  
 Steyerl connects entanglement and the state of paradoxical superimposition issued in 
by Schrödinger’s thought experiment with the status of the missing; with legal and political 
philosophy arguments concerning genocide as well as the thought image of the two bodies of 
the King; with Leibnizian monadology; and perhaps more interestingly, with the position of 
institutionally-authorized observers vis-à-vis less than evident evidential objects. She points 
out that the invisibility or archaic originality of these objects “is politically constructed and 
maintained” by epistemic as well as military violence, by the fog of war, by political twilight 
and class warfare as well as death from above (140-1). Shouldn’t we then add that these 
objects are not merely pushed into but may be the very mark of the establishment of our 
modern cities and societies as (she calls them) zero-probability zones? If so, then the point of 
studying these objects between archaism and technology, between philosophy and phot-
electric analysis as well as the legal, biopolitical and dramaturgical architectures that manage 
their determinacy and resolution, their performance and appearance or articulation at the 
limits of meaning, is to draw a cartography of zero-degree or zero-probability zones and 
institutions. 
 Such a cartography would no longer depend on the reference to phenomenological 
accounts of intentionality, the constancy of will, and the act of promising, or any notion of 
continuity for that matter. But would instead relate to what I’ve previously called, following 
John Berger, a landscape’s address.5 As we will see, in a world in which the iterations of 
capital depend as much on the speed and invisibility of algorithms as it does on epistemic, 
dramaturgical, and military violence, the very idea that the constancy of popular will or the 
performative force of the legal-linguistic act of promising suffice to ground or establish our 
societies of privatized social contracts can no longer be maintained.  
 Instead, we must explore the way in which structural, legal, and physical as well as 
psychological violence, which is repeated again and again (so that history and geography 
become a piling-up of corpses subject to high-speed betting), thereby interrupting the 
reciprocity and continuity of recognition and intentionality, get compressed in the objects that 
Steyerl calls “low-resolution monads” and the landscapes within which they’re found and 
which they produce. These low-resolution monads become, as she says, arche-fossils and 
diagrams of the creative destruction visiting our cities from above. They are the less-than-
evident evidence of the re-foundation of our cities and the world along the lines of a 




These indeterminate objects are low-resolution monads, in many cases literally 
materially compressed objects, fossilized diagrams of political and physical violence—
poor images of the conditions that brought them into being. Even if they cannot show 
the extrajudicial executions, political murders, or shootings at demonstrations that they 
might have recorded, they bear the traces of their own marginalization. Their poverty is 
not a lack, but an additional layer of information, which is not content but form. This 
form shows how the image is treated, how it is seen, passed on, or ignored, censored 
and obliterated. . . . 
Through their material composition, these poor images reach far beyond the sphere of 
representation and into a world where the order of things and humans, of life and death, 
and identity is suspended, and “all is plenum (and thus all matter is connected together). 
. . . And consequently every body feels the effect of all that takes place in the universe, 
so that he who sees all might read in each what is happening everywhere, and even 
what has happened or shall happen, observing in the present that which is far off as 
well in time as in place”6 
 
 Back when I was a kid in Colombia, we were haunted by the cross between the 
disappearance of our loved ones and the images of mass graves and gas oven chambers in the 
Guajira, Yarí, and Cauca regions, all of them potential or actual oil and mining regions near 
the ancestral lands of Nasa, Kogi, and Kívara indigenous peoples, which were beginning to 
circulate thanks to the work of anthropology teams digging up the apotheosis of the war from 
the entrails of the upside for all of us to look at it as one peers into a black box. Right now, as 
I write, I’m haunted once more by the images coming out of North Dakota. As the oil boom 
goes bust, the bankers and speculators get behind the Dakota Access pipeline, and the latter 
crosses the sacred lands of Native Americans at Standing Rock. Images come of Dakota 
Access protesters inspecting charred vehicles and signs in front of law enforcement 
barricades, grainy jpegs of military-grade vehicles lined up against native women and men on 
horseback, raw footage of mass arrests of protesters accused of rioting and trespassing, news 
snippets telling of Republican candidate Donald Trump’s close financial ties to the pipeline 
operator, and so on. It’s a mortifying repetition. 
 Do the natives have the slightest chance now that Trump has been elected president of 
the USA? Can the images coming out of the North Dakota “last stand” in late 2016, as well 
as the ones that haunt my childhood, be an example of the low-resolution monads described 
above? As I ask myself these questions, a text from my friend Drucilla Cornell, with whom 
I’m co-writng a book on hope in these hopeless times, pings and pins down these thoughts of 
monads, death, and repetition. 
She observes: 
 
It is going to be nightmarish times. We are doing a masterclass on our book [hers and 
Stephen Seely’s The Spirit of Revolution] and then Luce Irigaray is coming, and then 
public lectures. But obviously what we say has to take into account what has happened 
[Trump’s election].  I’m shaken to the core. So our book [hers and mine on hope] is 





 I believe, together with Drucilla and others, that Bloch’s ontology of hope, what he 
termed not-yet-being, holds a key to how to act in hopeless, nightmarish times. In a nutshell, 
if neither knowledge nor reality are fully constituted, if neither nature nor our established 
institutions represent fullness—which is another way of saying that the last word on justice, 
truth, or function has not been uttered yet—then they’re transitional and thus can be unfrozen 
as well as opened to retroactive transformation. What comes to mind is the way a landscape 
addresses us in, say, the southernmost parts of Latin America: “patches of grass and wild 
hedges are instersected by barren raw earth or gravel with cracks from which sulphuric steam 
and fire gush out. . . . Chaos is still able to penetrate the cracks of the imperfectly 
constituted/formed reality.”8 Cinema, too, is populated by this medium of the “undead” 
image. What comes to my mind isn’t Alien Resurrection as much as the Atacama desert in 
Guzmán’s Nostalgia For the Light, but the point remains: arche-fossils and anticipatory 
technical objects function like perpetual living mirrors of the universe. The strata of 
crystallized time in every monad capture and conserve a specific relation to the universe (“as 
in a long exposure photograph,” to repeat Steyerl’s characterization) but also condense the 
forms of observation, anticipatory and retroactive, that produce them as indelible moments 
and objects powerful enough to save the present come what may.  
 That is also what a protest does and why we protest in places like North Dakota or 
Bogotá: to save the present moment, this land and this water, whatever the future holds. To 
protest is, in this sense, to refuse being reduced to a zero by the establishment, by reducing 
the established institutions to their zero-degree. That is, drawing a line in the sand that 
displays certain architectural representations of society and the cosmos so as to evidence their 
inter-transformability. The resulting diagrams, like the images invoked before, relate to each 
other transformationally. The archaisms and technologies that we find through our own acts 
of drawing and digging, or protesting, become inward-growing and properly interminable.  
They renew institutions, time and space again. 
 At least in that respect, we find ourselves exactly in the same position in which 
Claude Lévi-Strauss found himself when he came upon the objects, cosmographies, and 
morphological configurations quite common among Amerindian and other “tribal” societies: 
the act of drawing, digging, or protesting isn’t simply a matter of dividing friends from 
enemies, or actors and painters from their audiences. Rather, it suggests another way beyond 
such dualisms and the polarization that is characteristic of our nightmarish times: to get 
closer and closer to what is being redeemed from the present within the hearts and minds of 
those of us who refuse to accept that the current logics of predation are anything other than 
contingent. This entails a perpetual perspectival alternateness of the self and the other, friend 
and enemy, painter and model, nature and artifice, which involves a radical normative 
investment and results in a radical or incommensurable dimensionality.  
 In accordance to such radicality, other worlds aren’t merely possible but certain. 
Lacking a point of focus, when I was a kid back in Bogotá during the apotheosis of the civil 
war, the landscape began addressing my imagination. I am referring to geography in a 
specific sort of way: the city and its violence affected me internally but also externally. It 
would not be right to say that this affect was either inside or inside; it was both or neither. I 
have just said: “it would not be right.” In doing so, I have invoked the image of the law, of 
what is right and truthful, justice and correction, a vertical movement of ascent or 
exteriorization that allows good violence to overcome bad violence. In yesteryears this was 
the space and the function of myth and the sacred—as in the old stories of blind justice, 
veiled justice. 
 
The Color of Law and the Economy is Gray 
 
 In the modern world, which we are told is fated to disenchant, the new regime of good 
and bad or winners and losers has been established between the gray disciplines of law and 
the economy. They fill the vacant place left by the withdrawal of the sacred, and just as the 
latter did before, aim to contain violence. This term is plagued by ambiguity: to contain 
means both to keep at bay and to conserve within. Economy and law erect a wall around the 
city to expel violence and keep it without, against violence, with the means of violence. So 
you see, the city affected me in the very precise sense that its violence came from within and 
only from within it came out and up; then it came crashing down, it came upon us. In, up, 
out. Crushing us.  
 This peculiar self-transcendence of the city and its violence allows for distinctions 
between “bad” or impolitical violence and “good” violence, the kind judges and the police 
use on a daily basis; but also ordinary economics. Observing it, Adam Smith, Immanuel 
Kant, and many others concluded that a new kind of faith could be placed in trade and 
commerce, which they saw as capable of ending religious bikering, the first Thirty Years 
War, and remake the world in the moral image of everlasting peace. But we know, we knew 
it already back then in Colombia, that good violence and bad violence may very well be one 
and the same. Call it a second disechantment, a loss of faith, and a failure of promise, for we 
remain at a loss to see and imagine what should be put in place of law and economics. 
 The city looks empty, a barren landscape punctuated by a pile of corpses in the central 
square and mass graves in the upside. There is no concept for this affect that colored for me 
and many others our perspective on the whole of reality, the world, life; and so, as it happens 
in every culture, what escaped the province of the concept was handed over to long-term 
work in images. The image of a city rained upon by lead and heavy metals, the image of a cat 
in a box, of empty buried boxes, and that other one, perhaps the oldest, of being adrift at sea. 
It encompasses ground and anchorage as well as the imaginary drawing of a horizon line, 
storm and calm, disaster and shipwreck, barely surviving (my cousin did not) and merely 
looking on—not a victim, let alone a martyr, just a spectator. 
 After that summer of solitude and pulp fiction, of slow trade and fast violence, in 
Bogotá I became theoros, the spectator. The spectator who has survived catastrophe and is 
therefore able to provide an oral testimony of what he or she has seen is the key persona in 
the drama of law and human rights. I want to suggest that the truth-value of testimonies in 
human rights reporting be seen as visual and geographical—a sort of speculative 
geography—in which the term “speculative” qualifies geography in a sense larger than what 
is usually thought. Becoming the spectator on that summer of solitude returned me to an 
earlier topographical experience, a way of seeing before geography became science: 
something more akin to the experience of peasants, of nomads and Amerindians, of hunters 
and cosmonauts.  
 This, again, is what novelist and art writer John Berger, whom I just paraphrased, 
calls “a landscape’s address.”9 I wish to locate his sublimely visual notion within a much 
longer and venerable tradition known to us as Speculative or Philosophical Geography and 
push the latter to the limits of meaning where a new articulation of the visual, the 
performative, and the dramaturgical might intersect the failure of logics of promising and the 
apotheosis of war that continue to haunt, like the missing people and the corpses they keep 
piling up, our lived time. 
 I have started to see geography as the representation of invisible origins, an artform 
lodged between the ascending impetus of Miltonian poetry and the descending conatus of 
documentary filmmaking. On the one hand, the poet seeks the highest standpoint that would 
allow him or her the position of a world spectator. Not actually or historically, of course, but 
only in the pictorial or dramaturgical sense: as a device of representation, a perspective or 
projection that results in a world image as ground. On the other hand, although the 
documentary filmmaker also accepts the role of vanishing points and imagination, in contrast 
with the poet she or he testifies of having nowhere to fall because of already having fallen. 
The Hawk-Hunter combat jets have already initiated their descent upon the city, the palace in 
Central Square is in flames, and the Promethean president and his utopia burn within it. All 
that remains are the bones of the missing deep in the upside of the Atacama Desert. Those 
bones are made out of compressed stardust while also functioning as fossilized diagrams of 
political and economic violence. Furthermore, the act of perpetually searching for them and 
perhaps one day digging them out marks time and space, making the moment of their 
redemption indelible, whatever the future may hold. Time and space multiply n-fold, and 
indexical modality of this dimensionality is no longer possibility but certainty.   
 From the high perspective of the poet one could come up with a moral image of the 
world conceived as the ultimate unity of our differences and competing interests in a 
kingdom of ends, an additive compilation of views toward the ultimate purpose of nature and 
history’s course, or the kinds of principles that equal, rational people would choose for 
themselves in practice, for instance. Something like imagining what would the voice or the 
will of the people seem like. My aunt’s shop in Bogotá was connected to Germany by a crime 
story. Ideas of justice, peace, and war lay beneath that story. Although unknown to me at the 
time, this was the beginning of a lifetime journey dedicated to understanding where our ideas 
of justice come from and why we hope to realize them.  
 I discovered the Berlin-Bogotá connection from another source of reading material 
that summer, the advertisement literature that accompanied the shop’s cosmetic products. 
There I read that in the mid-nineteenth century, standardized colors, cosmetics, and anti-
ageing or slimming products, made out of the same stuff with which one can make fertilizers 
but also gunpowder and bombs, gave origin to the world beyond dreams we all live in. The 
world of images. The world of spectacle. The world that, either because it has turned into an 
image itself or has been exhausted by the spectacle of trade and production, now faces the 
end. Think about it: the end of the world, what a crime story that would be. 
 It is no wonder that the little shop had so very few clients. After all, we sold lies made 
out of chemical magic, Farben, which in the German language means “colors.” I would like 
to think people knew they were being cheated and refused to buy into the lie, which explains 
my summer of solitude and pop fiction. However, that was not the case. The real reason why 
sales were few and far between at the shop is that the bulk of the business in plastics and 
colored chemicals took place by telephone. This was before the Internet, remember; and yet, 
in that sense at least, we were true successors and path-breaking entrepreneurs. That is, my 
aunt Clara, who was the businesswoman with ideas, my uncle Ulysses and my cousins. Not 
me. I was just bored to tears that summer before discovering Poe, Hammett, and Bustos 
Domeq, a kid, not even a salesman but a numbed nineteen-eighties teenager trying to get his 
hands on what little money he could in order to fulfil his dreams of buying a BMX bicycle.  
 Aunt Clara and the cousins were the smaller-scale successors of one of the giants of 
the century, a German company dealing in plastics and chemicals called Farben. IG Farben, 
to be more precise, or Interessen-Gemeinschaft Farbenindustrie, a conglomerate that at some 
point in the second half of the twentieth-century became both the largest company in Europe 
and the most powerful chemical corporation in the world. The name literally means “a 
community of interests in the making of colors” or dye-making industries. It immediately 
calls our attention toward the intertwinement between biography, art and history, technology 
and trade, Kantian aesthetics and the law, and politics of justice and perpetual peace, which I 
now teach at a London university. Farben’s story also points us in the direction of a yet-to-
come global history and theory of the visible, as well as of the constant that John Berger 
called a “landscape’s address.”  
 That would be a grand story, if not for the fact that the history of Farbenindustrie 
reveals something altogether different about who we are, where we come from, and the ultra-
modern world we live in: how we got here and how it will all end. It is the story of the crime 
of the century, of all centuries.  
 The company’s pioneers and predecessors, BASF, Agfa, Griesheim-Elektron, Bayer, 
and Hoescht had been working together since at least World War I. They finally came 
together in 1925 to form IG Farben. Their scientists and researchers made some of the most 
important and influential discoveries in the modern history of medicine and materials, from 
antibiotics to polyurethane, and many of them were awarded Nobel Prizes for their 
contributions to the advancement of humankind.  
 Following the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany, however, the company became one 
of the government’s principal contractors and a willing executor of its policies. During World 
War II, IG Farben established a factory adjacent to the concentration camp at Auschwitz-
Birkenau and another at Mauthausen-Gusen. Using forcibly displaced labor, the factory made 
everything from toothbrushes and cosmetics to plastics, such as the ones my aunt would later 
adapt to be sold as slimming girdles in Colombia.  
 IG Farben also purchased prisoners from the camps, to be used as guinea pigs in the 
testing of new, developing compounds that included a sleep-inducing drug in gas form. It 
later reported that all of its test subjects for that drug had died. Ominously, IG Farben 
invested in and owned a shareholder majority of over 42 per cent in Deutsche Gessellschaft 
für Schädlingsbekämpfung, a subsidiary of the Degussa group, known as Degesch for short. 
Gold dental fillings removed from the mouths of inmates were sent from the concentration 
camps to be processed by Degussa, while Degesch used front companies Testa and Heli to 
produce and sell to the Schutzstaffel-Totenkopfverbände (the infamous SS) and the 
Wehrmacht Army the cyanide-based pesticide known as Zyklon A and B. Zyklon B was used 
to kill at least a million people in the final solution chambers of Auschwitz, Majdanek, and 
Dachau. 
 Primo Levi worked there, as a slave for the Chemical Komando stationed in one of IG 
Farben’s factories at Auschwitz. An Italian chemist himself, Levi is best known as the author 




 It is said that on one occasion the American novelist Philip Roth suggested to Levi 
that such a period of captivity had been, in some strange sense, a gift. The former chemist 
and author replied with these words:  
 
A friend of mine, an excellent doctor, told me many years ago: “Your remembrances of 
before and after are in black and white; those of Auschwitz and of your travel home are 
in Technicolor.” He was right. Family, work, home, these are good things in 




Years after reading Levi’s memoir I found the paragraph quoted once more, together with a 
reference to Farben’s story, in a book written by a famed anthropologist I met while at 
university in Colombia. His name is Michael Taussig. Miguel, as his friends call him, has 
been described by The New York Times as a sort of real-life Indiana Jones who divides his 
time between a classroom at Columbia University and the Amazon jungle in Colombia. 
“He’s like a rock star,” wrote The Time’s Emily Eakin, citing one of his students; “he’s the 
professor that all the students think is cool.”13 Some of his colleagues might think otherwise, 
given the unconventional nature of Taussig’s work, dealing with as varied a set of topics as 
the devil, cocaine, fetishism, critical theory, global warming, and the Western discomfort 
with vivid colors. 
 
Fetishes: Law in a Lawless Land 
  Back in 2001 I invited Taussig to come to Bogotá to take part in a conference titled 
“Politics and Law in a Lawless Land.” The title was not meant to be ironic—that is, 
identifying with while also keeping a safe distance from views that fetishized and sexualized 
Latin America as both fascinatingly exotic yet infantile; as if our guests were privileged 
viewers of both the modern civic state and some reputedly primitive state of nature able to 
guide us on. Instead, the title was a straightforward and self-critical: we were questioning our 
own ambiguity, involvement, and complicity with such views, including these seemingly 
pure “academic” conferences. We wanted to play with the ambiguity of academic and critical 
practices that place critics and experts in the position of privileged viewers who promise to 
give us the real thing instead of the appearance or the bad copy. The gathering, part academic 
and part activist, also included a famous American critical lawyer; the doyen of British 
political and legal realist philosophy (inspired by American realism and anthropology); a 
renowned Portuguese sociologist active in the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre and the 
alter-globalization movement of the time; and a young philosopher working in North 
Carolina who was an expert in French and Italian post-modernism, soon to become famous 
worldwide for his work on American constitutionalism and empire. It felt weird and even 
risky to have as varied a collection of guests travel from places like Britain, Portugal, and the 
United States to talk about politics and law in a country branded as failed and lawless. But 
perhaps that was why they all accepted, in spite of the protestations of their friends and 
partners. Back then, Colombia was in the midst of the cruelest and most dangerous part of its 
60-year old civil war. 
 For the opening event at the conference, I had proposed a debate between Michael 
Taussig and Harvard critical lawyer Duncan Kennedy. On that memorable occasion, Taussig 
came on stage posing as a fisherman from the Caribbean carrying a heavy load of creatures 
from the sea on his way to Sunday market. Without saying a word, he wandered around the 
stage in his magenta-coloured guayabera shirt, an imaginary fishing net on his back, for what 
seemed like a very long ten minutes; as if waiting for the pescador caribeño to complete his 
performative transformation into a character from one of Samuel Beckett’s monologues.  
 In retrospect, it occurs to me that Justice herself was among the creatures carried by 
the fisherman on his net; after all, according to the stories of old the veiled goddess of the 
scales rose up with the Fates from the springs and the foam of the encircling world-ocean. 
 Besides lecturing on philosophy and law, back then I spent a lot of time writing 
poetry as part of a group whose work focused on the links between high modernism and 
ancient, specifically Amerindian, Hellenistic, and Egyptian mythology. Stories of the veiled 
goddess of justice, war, and wisdom presided over our poetry sessions as well as over the law 
and politics event. In our minds, those stories linked Athens and Saïs with the Vaupés and the 
Amazon, the theater of the war in Colombia.  
 The poetry group was being mentored at the time by an indigenous palabrero from the 
Amazon, a wordsmith named Jesús Martínez, and the poet Otto Ricardo Torres. Together 
they taught us how to read and interpret the myths, comparing Greek and Egyptian allegories 
of nature and art to the Yuruparí cosmology of the Amazonian Tikuna and the Kívara. This 
included a comparative reading of the stories of Neith, Isis-Athena/Artemis, and the Kívara 
priestess Tayira-Inírida. The stories revolved around the duality between nature and artifice, 
truth and justice, as well as ways to gain knowledge of and access to reality, whether through 
technology or through what we saw at the time as the dual aspect of poetic images and the 
fetish.  
 To assist with our study of archaic cosmologies, some of us engaged with and 
benefited greatly from a comparative reading of 19th-century natural philosophy and poetry, 
especially Schiller’s The Mission of Moses (1790) and his On the Sublime (1801), which we 
found particularly apt given the climate of violence and war that surrounded us; Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment (1790); the work of John Milton; and, in particular, von Humboldt’s 
Essay on the Geography of Plants (1807), the result of the famous German geographer and 
naturalist’s travels through South America. We read the 1985 Colombian edition of 
Humboldt’s essay, which included two appendices of commentaries by Francisco J. Caldas 
and a relevant dedication to Goethe, complete with an allegorical image of nature as a 
polymastic Isis/Artemis, which also appears in the German edition. Now I realize how much 
the creolized image of the veiled goddess, from ancient cosmologies and allegories to early 
modern geography and botany as well as German Romantic poetry and philosophy, informed 
our conceptual framework for the conference: the notion of “a duality made product, a third” 
belongs to her; what can be termed radical dualism.
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 The idea for the Bogotá debates was to go beyond any simplistic binary thought in our 
conceptions of nature and civilization, fact and value, our philosophies of the limit, and our 
critical theories. In order to achieve that goal, we invited the anthropologist and the lawyer to 
contrast their views on the allegedly dualist, reversible, and proportionate nature of fetishes 
and fetishism. Not only the sexual kind but also, and more precisely, the systems that emerge 
from the curious bond elicited by certain objects and landscapes invested with emotional 
qualities or magical properties.  
 These objects are concrete embodiments of the quantitative and qualitative antinomies 
we come upon as soon as we go thinking beyond percepts and perspecta, in our attempts to 
grasp reality in its absoluteness within schemas or concepts. But instead of serving purely as 
limits to the activity of thought, they react back upon us, animating the heart and mind, 
setting our spiritual powers in motion, “into a play that is self-maintaining and even 
strengthens the powers to that end.”15 They can be archetypical, as happens with icons, idols, 
and ideals, in that they are objects completely adequate to an idea; think of the ideal stoic 
person as one who is completely adequate to the virtues of stoicism. In this case, the object is 
nothing but the projection of a necessary maximum standard of perfection, an aspiration or 
anticipation.  
 In other cases, such anticipatory objects, symbolic forms, and metaphoric transfers 
can be truly world-making in the more fundamental sense whereby how and why they come 
to exist can be understood by taking them not as givens, but as solutions to an antecedent 
problem: not simply that there’s no good fit between human life and its environment—no 
given humanity or standard thereof opposed to a supposedly given nature, something that 
some consciousness lacks and others possesses—that can be relativized, withdrawn and 
taken, or overtaken (for instance in technology, as some “post-humanists” seem to argue). 
Rather, the problem would be that such unfitness is itself a reflection of the fact that neither 
in nature nor in reality itself could we find such good fit or harmony. Reality is out of joint, 
and therefore a consciousness on the way to humanization would be one that creates its 
symbolic forms by losing itself in the night of the absolute, of fantasy and myth, in the out-
of-joint-ness of reality, in rhythmic affect, or in what Goethe called the flight behind an 
image.  
 Only in and through its work on myth, rhythm, and the absolute can consciousness by 
attained, precisely in order to respond to what Hans Blumenberg called “the absolutism of 
reality.”16 Understood in this sense, archetypal objects and metaphoric transfers are not the 
result of a movement of ascent following descent into the night of the world, but of work in 
and through it, a negativity that draws its worth “from an almost substantive absoluteness.”17   
 Aren’t archaic objects and metaphoric transfers precisely the embodiment of an 
upsurge of negativity, not only a minor term, but more like a free fall that has nowhere to 
fall? If so, then rather than falling or ascending toward the universal, the very point of archaic 
objects, metaphoric transfers, and symbolic forms is to “crash-land”—in the case of Frantz 
Fanon in June 1950, for instance; in a hotel room in Paris that refuses to rent rooms to nègre 
visitors. “Why?” Fanon asks, “purely and simply because their Anglo-Saxon customers (who 
are rich and who, as everyone knows, hate nègres) threatened to move out.”18  
 Notice that this “absolute reality” is, for the racialized black person as well as for the 
abnormalized sexed being, tantamount to death, as Fanon expresses in the last two lines of his 
unfinished play Les mains parallèles: “To no longer see mute whiteness/ To no longer see 
death.”19 This being so, then the way to survival and liberation is to build a room of one’s 
own, as Virginia Woolf said, but such a room would be a space in which one not only refuses 
in imagination and practice one’s amputation of being—confronting reality rather than 
escaping from it as that which normatively forecloses one’s future—but also in which one is 
pushed or sped up by transformative iterations of the abyss of the past one is obliged to dive 
into, beyond the normative field that closes off hopeful time.  
 In that space of refusal, acceleration, and play, one’s soul can feel as vast as the earth 
and the seas. This is the feeling of the sublime, the sea theater in which the paradoxical 
distance and closeness brought about by farce and laughter or Brechtian Verfremdungseffekt 
leads to breakthrough: first, to catharsis (a medical or purgative treatment in therapy and 
theater, for instance using “savage” music to cure “savage” interior rhythms, or crucially and 
more generally the purgation of supposedly antisocial elements), as both Milton and Kant put 
it when considering the meaning of tragedy and play since Aristotle, and second, to iteration 
and play; that is, the repeated confrontation of archaic origins, leading to and through a 
reality that has been so far too much to bear.  
 
Acceleration, Funk & Play: In Defense of a Poor Dramaturgy 
 
Play must be understood here as technique and technology, a structure consisting of the 
successive repetition of previously veiled or archaic origins that reveal new layers of and 
create new spaces for meaningful action in relation to the cyclicality of life. In that structure 
an (Orphean) story is retold and understood at different levels, so that the effect is not merely 
cathartic but a renewed and accelerated (Promethean) understanding of the point of reference 
and origin, which speeds up the process of self-transformation and is also transformative of 
the environment. 
 Notice how this structure is not being described here as either one or the other, but 
rather both Orphean and Promethean. Put simply, a normative social or “naturalized” field 
that is racist or sexist closes off the future for the racialized, gendered, or colonized 
designated as inferior subjects: slow and lazy or backwards and deviated. In this aspect of 
what one can call staged face-to-face relations, which is an aspect of relations of production 
rather than occurring outside of it, the very stage and framework of recognition fails.  
 Consider, for instance, understandings of culture and science that are now as 
widespread as they are rife with social Darwinism, emboldened by conceptions of progress 
that presume the superiority, supremacy, or developed status of certain societies as an 
inevitable feature of linear history. In that framework, indigenous people brought to a brink 
of extinction by dispossession, pandemic, forced displacement, and genocide, together with 
kidnapped populations brought under slavery, are represented as less developed and thus 
features of the natural world that would be left behind in modern practices forging a path to 
the future of a superior humankind. This is clearly a distortion of natural selection. For 
there’s nothing natural about that staged narrative: there is at no instance a group or a culture 
that is not being affected by others, and no reciprocity without alterity; in other words, there 
is no condition of nonhuman factors to which the human beings involved couldn’t otherwise 
adapt, and there has never been one.  
 As Lewis R. Gordon says, quoting Franz Boas, “such teleological claims have no 
business in a theory that simply argues that what survives at any moment is what is enabled 
by its environment. Further, surviving today does not entail doing the same tomorrow. Thus 
everything that coexists at any moment is equally evolved, for the environment,” which is 
never a given, “sustains each organism.”20 Ditto, this is not because there is some harmonious 
relation between a given organism and a given environment in which the latter provides the 
former with its proper place, but precisely the opposite: because there is no transparent fit 
between human and nonhuman factors or within nonhuman reality; there’s no great chain of 
being. “Comparisons in which certain groups are relegated to the status of primitive (that is, 
belonging to the past) don’t work, then,” Gordon explains, “because the fact of their 
existence means that they’ve evolved into the present time. The move to culture doesn’t 
change this fact.”21 Such unwarranted comparisons proceed as if those represented as slow, 
backwards, developing, or deviant were in effect peoples of the past.  
 The subjected group is in this way forcibly displaced out of the lived reality of 
cultural life; “they suffer a living death” and are zombified, as Gordon, channeling Fanon, 
observes.
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 This zombification can be examined as itself an established set of rituals of 
cultural performance, with peoples’ ways of life displayed as museum pieces or as “factual” 
evidence in courts and tribunals as well as global economic institutions, with the conditions 
of the organization of such displays and relations—the stage or establishment of 
recognition—in the hands of the colonizing, racist, sexist, and classist group. Crucially, as he 
points out, given the previous arguments there is no reason why there could not be Indo- or 
Afro-modernisms, as well as futurisms, simultaneous with Euromodernisms or indeed other 
forms of manifesting that which is modern or futurist, such as in the case of the contemporary 
Gulf- or Sino-futurisms critically dissected by visual artists and writers like Sophia al-Maria, 
Stephanie Bailey, and Usma Rizvi.
23
  
 Their insight is that these more or less retro-futurist, archaic, practical, and artistic 
objects produce spaces or fields of play, within—for instance—sexual difference. Play must 
be understood in this sense as a new choreography or a new dramaturgy that can be shared 
just like dance or a theatrical play: “rooted in known dances and yet always offering the 
possibility of creative innovation” or succession.24 The crucial point here—to continue with 
the example of sexuality—is that just as neither of the two normalized sexes, heterosexual 
masculinity and femininity, can be totally constituted in themselves, hedged, foreclosed, or 
completed, reality itself is incomplete. Our multiple sexual differentiations are not deviations 
from a certain norm or rule but artful and ethical in the sense of being a proper response to an 
antinomic reality. Therefore nothing is “natural” in the sense of being completely and 
absolutely given, and nothing is “civilized” or artificial in the sense of being normalized, 
ruled, or legalised. As Schiller puts it, in the midst of the kingdom of natural forces and in the 
midst of the sacred kingdom of laws an impulse to form (which he calls aesthetic) is at work, 
unnoticed, to build a “third joyous kingdom of play and of semblance, in which man is 
relieved of the shackles of circumstance, and released from all that might be called constraint, 
alike in the physical and in the moral sphere.”25 Jacqueline Rose, in turn, describes in similar 
terms the questioning of our sexuate being as a matter of justice:  
 
“The requirement . . . that there shall be a single kind of sexual life for everyone,” 
writes Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents, “cuts off a fair number from sexual 
enjoyment, and so becomes the course of serious injustice” (Ungerechtitigkeit). And 
yet as he himself puts it only a few pages earlier, for a law to be just (Gerechtigkeit) it 
must be universal, that is, broken in no-one’s favour; although this tells us nothing, he 




Rose concludes that this paradox is not simply internal to a universal right to live and enjoy 
one’s sexuality. The paradox of freedom, sexual freedom if you like, is that it demands a 
political-moral space that does not normalize the content of sexuality itself. Ditto, this can be 
generalized: Schiller, for example, teaches us that aesthetic play helps free us from the over-
seriousness of revolutionary politics, which can easily degenerate into self-righteous 
authoritarianism and violence. This notion entails achieving a balance between percepts and 
perspecta, on the one hand, and the demands of morality, normativity, and politics, on the 
other. “Sense herself,” Schiller argued, “must, with triumphant power, remain mistress of her 
own domain, and resist the violence of the mind that, by its usurping tactics, would fain 
inflict upon her. In a single word: personality must keep the sensuous drive within its proper 
bounds, and receptivity, or nature, must do the same with the formal drive.”27 
 Fetishism in sexual practice may be an example of autopoeitic systems, but so is also 
the self-organization of matter as sublime nature, as well as sublime art, master/servant 
relations, the market in commodities and money, and the law and politics that accompany 
such trade.  
 We understood these landscapes and objects as becoming the focus of our illusions 
and desire while also playing a central role in the everyday theater of our imaginations, 
exchanges, and institutions. On that stage we act out our deepest dramas and let loose our 
most unspeakable fantasies, but may also let go of them. Here the specters of the past haunt 
us just as we dream up utopias for the future: “What to seek! What to flee!” In such words, 
the riddle we attempted to solve finds its best expression. This is the question of the fetish, 
the central problem involved in what it means to generalize a will, to become human, or 
animal, or something other, something else.    
 Thus it fell upon the radical anthropologist and the critical lawyer to speak at length 
of magical objects and physical as well as legal geographies in our Bogotá debate. That 
seemed quite apposite. After all, Colombia is supposed to be the country of magical realism. 
But, as said before, for over sixty years it has also been the theater of a war in which so-
called “violent actors” have done truly unspeakable deeds. What humanity might become in 
such a context was, and still is, both a potential and an urgent question. And so, we wanted 
then as we do now to draw attention most urgently and concretely to the contradictions and 
equivocations of being addressed by the sublime landscape of this country in a state of war, 
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